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Shareholder Litigation Rights and Corporate Acquisitions
Chune Young Chunga, Incheol Kimb,†, Monika K. Rabarisonc, Thomas Y. Tod, and Eliza Wue1

ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on managers’ acquisition decisions. Our
experimental design exploits a U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on July 2, 1999 that
resulted in a reduction in shareholder class actions. We find that, since the ruling, firms in Ninth
Circuit states acquire larger targets. Furthermore, acquirers’ returns are lower in these states,
especially for those with weaker corporate governance. Further analysis shows that value
destruction is the result of managers’ freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using
overvalued equity. Overall, our findings indicate the importance of shareholder litigation as an
external governance mechanism.
JEL classification: G34, K22, M41
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1. Introduction
The finance literature recognizes that agency problems can lead corporate managers to
make acquisitions that do not maximize shareholder value. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow
hypothesis argues that managers have an incentive to grow their firms excessively in order to
increase the resources they control. Masulis et al. (2007) show that managers of firms with
poor corporate governance are the most likely to engage in empire-building acquisitions that
destroy shareholder value. Because acquisitions are a primary form of corporate investment, it
is important to minimize managers’ incentives to pursue self-serving acquisitions. In this study,
we address this issue by examining how the threat of shareholder class actions affects
managers’ acquisition decisions.
In the U.S., a securities class action litigation provides a mechanism through which
shareholders can sue for managerial misconduct. 2 Such lawsuits are designed to provide
recourse in the event that other governance mechanisms are not effective, making them very
useful for firms with poor corporate governance.3 In the agent-shareholder framework, the
existing literature presents empirical evidence that shareholders have used class action lawsuits
as a tool to express their dissatisfaction with or discipline inefficient management. For instance,
there is much empirical evidence that litigation negatively affects firm value (e.g., Bhagat and
Romano, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). When sued, firms experience significant executive
2

For example, a class action was filed against BT Office Products International, Inc., in 1996, stating that the firm’s
10Q, management discussion and analysis, and certain press releases were false and misleading with respect to
the firm’s acquisition strategy, which consequently resulted in material losses for shareholders. Ultimately, BT
Office Products agreed to pay USD 1.48 million to settle the case.
3

Class action litigation is particularly important in the U.S. because ownership is widely dispersed and, hence,
often does not provide enough incentive for shareholders to monitor a firm’s management (Cheng et al., 2010).

2
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officer and director turnover (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Aharony et al., 2015). Furthermore,
such firms are less likely to finance their investments externally (Arena and Julio, 2015), reduce
overinvestment (McTier and Wald, 2011), or improve the quality of their corporate governance
(Ferris et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2010). In summary, class litigation is an effective monitoring
mechanism exercised by shareholders.
Our study extends this line of research, investigating whether a reduction in class or
group litigation leads managers to make value-decreasing investment decisions and, if so, in
what way. Specifically, we exploit the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals July 2, 1999 ruling, In
re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, as a quasi-natural experiment to determine
whether a regulation change can influence how effectively shareholders monitor managerial
decisions. We choose this Ninth Circuit Court ruling for the following reason. Despite the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, which the U.S. Congress enacted to
make it more difficult for shareholders to file frivolous lawsuits, the incidence of securities class
actions subsequently increased (Choi et al., 2009). In response to a call for tighter regulations,
the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in 1999 mandating stricter applications of
the PSLRA standards. Under common law, laws are created by courts using the doctrine of
precedent, requiring judges to make decisions by considering past cases that have set a
precedent for future cases. The ruling ultimately discourages shareholder plaintiffs from
proceeding with legal action unless they have clear evidence of intentional managerial
misbehavior. Crane and Koch (2018) find that, after this ruling, the number of class actions
dropped by 43% in Ninth Circuit states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). In comparison, other circuits experienced a 14% increase in
3
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class action lawsuits in the same period. Thus, we consider the Ninth Circuit Court ruling as an
exogenous shock to shareholder litigation rights.
To explore whether class action litigation plays an effective monitoring role in corporate
governance, we consider mergers and acquisitions (M&As) under the Ninth Circuit Court ruling
as our empirical setting. M&As are substantial corporate investments that have an economic
impact on firm value; as a result, the views of shareholders and managers on M&As can differ
significantly (Chen et al., 2007). In a related study, Jensen (1986) posits that M&As are a
primary method used by managers to reduce their personal undiversified risk or to increase the
scope of their authority. Researchers have documented cases in which a target firm’s
shareholders have sued the firm’s board of directors or managers owing to a breach of duty,
such as concealing material information about the deal or forcing the shareholders to accept
unfavorable terms or a low bid price (Jarrell, 1985). Krishnan et al. (2012) show that M&As
subject to target firm shareholder lawsuits are less likely to be completed, and have
significantly higher takeover premiums if they are completed. However, few studies have
examined how the outcomes of M&As are affected by a change in the regulatory landscape
that directly reduces the risk of shareholder litigation.
We first compare the performance of acquisitions by U.S. firms headquartered in Ninth
Circuit states with that by firms headquartered in other states around the time of the Ninth
Circuit Court ruling. This strategy effectively isolates the effect of class action risk on acquisition
performance from that of unobservable covariates. Using corporate acquisitions announced
between 1996 and 2003, we examine the performance of these transactions for the four-year
periods before and after the ruling. We find that, after the ruling, the five-day cumulative
4
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abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition announcement dates are, on average, 1.32
percentage points lower for acquiring firms headquartered in Ninth Circuit states than they are
for firms in other states. This finding suggests that the reduced threat of class action after the
ruling has increased the probability that managers will undertake value-destroying, self-serving
acquisitions.
Next, we investigate the mechanisms through which managers destroy shareholder value.
First, consistent with managers’ empire-building motives, we find that managers in Ninth Circuit
states began acquiring larger firms when it became more difficult for shareholders to form class
action lawsuits. Second, acquisitions in the Ninth Circuit states began including greater
proportions of equity payments, implying that these managers were likely to be conducting
empire-building acquisitions using overvalued equity. Furthermore, we find that the threat of
class action litigation has a greater effect on acquirer returns in firms with weaker corporate
governance, that is, firms with high E-index scores, few blockholders, low CEO ownership, or
CEO duality. This result makes sense because the threat of litigation was likely playing an
important role in the governance of these firms before the ruling, thereby limiting managers’
empire building at the expense of shareholder wealth.
Finally, we conduct a series of additional analyses. The findings are as follows. First, the
reduced threat of class actions by shareholders has induced managers of firms in Ninth Circuit
states to be overly optimistic about future earnings announcements surrounding M&As. Second,
after the ruling, managers in Ninth Circuit states inflated earnings in the quarter prior to making
an acquisition. Moreover, this behavior occurred only when acquisitions were funded by stock.
This result suggests that, since the ruling, managers have been incentivized to pursue empire5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313

building acquisitions using overvalued equity, fueling a spate of value-destroying, self-serving
acquisitions. As a final test, we investigate whether the Ninth Circuit ruling affects the likelihood
of CEO replacement, especially when CEOs are engaged in value-decreasing acquisitions. We
find a lower probability of CEO replacement (and forced CEO replacement) after the ruling for
firms in Ninth Circuit states than for firms in other states. Moreover, the likelihood of CEO
replacement is not significantly affected by value-decreasing acquisitions. This implies that a
lower threat of shareholder litigation increases managerial entrenchment, thus contributing to
managers’ value-destroying, empire-building acquisitions.
Our study contributes to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the existing
literature on the role of corporate governance in M&As, which is well documented. For instance,
Byrd and Hickman (1992) examine tender offers and find that independent boards are
associated with higher bidder returns. Datta et al. (2001) find that managers with equity-based
compensation have a greater incentive to make good acquisitions. Masulis et al. (2007) show
that acquiring firms with higher anti-takeover provisions have lower announcement returns.
Although existing studies have examined the role of conventional governance mechanisms (e.g.,
board characteristics, compensation structures, or anti-takeover provisions) in M&As, few
examine how the threat of shareholder litigation as an external governance tool affects a firm’s
acquisition decisions. We address this gap by exploiting a regulatory reform that affected the
threat of class action shareholder litigation to examine the role that this threat plays in
acquisition decisions.
Second, our study contributes to the literature on stock price manipulations in M&As.
Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) show that acquiring firms often overstate their
6
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earnings prior to stock swap announcements in order to boost their stock prices. However,
Gong et al. (2008) find that acquirers who do so are more likely to attract subsequent lawsuits.
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) find that firms seeking to be acquired also engage in
earnings management. Cumming et al. (2019) show that stock price manipulation prior to
M&As increases the probability that an M&A deal will be withdrawn and reduces the premium
paid. Our study adds to this literature by showing that a reduced threat of class action litigation
by shareholders makes it more likely that managers of acquiring firms will engage in earnings
manipulation to boost their firms’ stock prices before M&As.
Third, our study contributes to the literature on the effect of shareholder litigation rights
on corporate policies. On the positive side, Ferris et al. (2007) and Appel (2019) find that the
threat of shareholder litigation plays an important role in corporate governance by limiting
managers’ ability to introduce governance provisions and compensation structures that are
prone to agency problems. Houston et al. (2019) find that the threat of shareholder litigation
encourages voluntary disclosure practices by firms. On the negative side, Lin et al. (2019) show
that the threat of shareholder litigation discourages corporate innovation, owing to the
potential for project failure. In this case, the resulting stock price reduction would likely present
shareholders with an opportunity to file a lawsuit related to a breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly,
Chu and Zhao (2019) show that the threat of shareholder litigation encourages managers to
select acquisitions with minimal risk, thus avoiding lawsuits rather than selecting acquisitions
that maximize shareholder wealth. This result is consistent with Jensen’s (1993) suggestion that
because most lawsuits are frivolous, managers have a legal incentive to avoid such lawsuits by
minimizing downside risk rather than maximizing shareholder value. This study contributes to
7
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this literature by examining how the threat of shareholder litigation acts as a governance tool,
as well as its effect on acquisition decisions.
Our study is closest in spirit to that of Chu and Zhao (2019), but differs markedly in terms
of the hypotheses developed and tested. Chu and Zhao (2019) assume that the threat of
shareholder litigation forces managers to select acquisitions with minimal risk in order to avoid
lawsuits, which limits them from selecting acquisitions that maximize shareholder wealth. In
contrast, we assume that this threat of litigation plays an important role in external
governance, thus encouraging managers to select acquisitions that do maximize shareholder
wealth. Naturally, our findings also differ significantly from theirs. However, the biggest
distinction lies in the likely difference in the quality of the corporate governance standards
within firms targeted by derivative lawsuits and class actions.4 In a derivative suit, the financial
remedy goes to the firm. Therefore, a shareholder is only likely to file a derivative lawsuit if
s/he believes the firm can use the financial remedy to improve shareholder wealth. This
requires that shareholders have faith in the firm, and that the firm can properly address
managerial misconduct and improve its corporate governance to prevent future misconduct.
On the other hand, in the case of class actions, the financial remedy goes only to the class of

4

Furthermore, the legal environment with regard to “frivolous” lawsuits associated with derivative and
class action lawsuits prior to the changes in legislation was quite different. Prior to the staggered adoption of UD
laws, shareholders were able to bypass company directors’ agreements and initiate a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation. Ni and Yin (2018) suggest that, “the availability of the ‘futility exception’ caused abusive use of
derivative lawsuits, wasting time and money for courts and corporations” (p. 172). This suggests that it was very
easy for shareholders to file “frivolous” lawsuits. On the other hand, after the 1995 PSLRA, the number of
“frivolous” class action lawsuits likely decreased, even though the overall number of class actions increased. Hence,
more “good” than “frivolous” class action lawsuits were filed before the 1999 Ninth Circuit ruling. Therefore, it is
important to show that it was only after it became more difficult for shareholders to litigate, after the ruling, that
the number of “good” class action lawsuits dropped.

8
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plaintiff shareholders. This could indicate that the shareholders have little faith that the firm
will use the financial remedy to improve its corporate governance and performance. Therefore,
these shareholders are better off seeking a financial remedy for themselves. Overall, the
differences between the financial remedy payouts suggest that firms targeted by class actions
are likely to be governed less well than are firms targeted by derivative lawsuits.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature to
provide the legal background of M&A litigation, develop our hypotheses, and present our
research design. Section 3 describes the data and explains the variable construction. Section 4
examines how the threat of shareholder class action litigation affects acquisition decisions, and
Section 5 identifies the channels through which value destruction takes place. Section 6
describes a set of robustness tests and additional analyses. Lastly, section 7 concludes the
paper.

2. Literature review, hypotheses, and research design
2.1. Institutional background
Under U.S. laws, corporate officers and directors have fiduciary duties to undertake
actions that are in the best interests of shareholders, and shareholders can take legal action if
they identify a breach of such duties. Shareholder litigation occurs mainly as derivative lawsuits
or as securities class actions.

5

Indeed, consistent with the finding of Krishnan et al. (2012) that 87.6% of M&A lawsuits are class action suits,
while only 3.4% are derivative suits, Chu and Zhao (2019) report that only 22.17% (i.e., 51 out of 230) of the M&A
litigation cases filed between 2000 and 2012 were derivative lawsuits.

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313

In a derivative lawsuit, shareholders pursue the claims on behalf of the corporation (i.e.,
the corporation is the plaintiff); hence, any financial recovery goes to the corporation. However,
various studies find that derivative suits rarely close with monetary settlements (e.g., Romano,
1991; Erickson, 2010). Therefore, shareholders usually benefit only indirectly from improved
corporate governance and better corporate managerial actions. In commencing a derivative
lawsuit, shareholders are required to first demand that the board of directors address the
allegations, which the board can either accept or refuse. Directors almost always decide against
proceeding with litigation because they themselves are often the persons named in the lawsuit
(Swanson, 1992). To prevent the board from blocking legitimate lawsuits, courts introduced the
“futility exception” to allow litigant shareholders to bypass the board (Kinney, 1994). However,
this exception resulted in abuses of the system. In response, starting in 1989, states began
adopting universal demand (UD) laws, which require that shareholders obtain board approval
prior to initiating a derivative lawsuit. Overall, UD laws made it more difficult for shareholders
to file such lawsuits.
In contrast to a derivative lawsuit, a securities class action lawsuit addresses direct harm
to shareholders. The plaintiff is the class of shareholders who initiate the lawsuit against
management. Class actions provide a mechanism for shareholders who purchased or sold
securities at a price that was affected by managerial misconduct to recover from financial loss.
Financial recovery from class actions is paid directly, and only to the plaintiff class of
shareholders. Empirical evidence shows that many derivative lawsuits are accompanied by class
actions. For example, in a comparative study of shareholder litigation, Erickson (2011) reports
that about 75% of the derivative lawsuits in the sample were accompanied by class actions.
10
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2.2. Effect of shareholder litigation on corporate value and policy
Earlier studies related to shareholder litigation document the ex post consequences of
class action lawsuits on firms. For example, Ferris et al. (2007) and Cheng et al. (2010) show
that firms’ corporate governance quality improves after a lawsuit is filed. In addition, McTier
and Wald (2011) find that sued firms subsequently reduce overinvestment, and HumpheryJenner (2012) shows that a CEO is more likely to be replaced after a lawsuit. A recent series of
studies examine the ex ante role of the threat of shareholder litigation. On the positive side,
Houston et al. (2019) find that this threat encourages voluntary corporate disclosure practices,
and Appel (2019) finds that this threat limits managers from introducing governance provisions
that are prone to agency problems. On the negative side, Lin et al. (2019) show that
shareholder litigation threat discourages managers from engaging in innovation, and Chu and
Zhao (2019) find that the threat of derivative litigation encourages managers to select
acquisitions with minimal risk, thus avoiding lawsuits rather than selecting acquisitions that
maximize shareholder wealth. However, whether the risk of class action litigation specifically
plays an ex ante disciplinary role in reducing management agency costs in M&As remains an
open question.
2.3. Shareholder litigation in M&As
The M&A literature shows that managers often conduct empire-building acquisitions at
the expense of shareholder value (Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2012), and
that one way in which shareholders can respond to such wrongdoing is by filing a lawsuit. In the
U.S., lawsuits related to M&As can be filed as class actions, derivative lawsuits, or other (less
common) forms. Class actions and derivative lawsuits are both forms of shareholder11
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representative litigation. The plaintiff's law firm pursues the matter at the request of a specific
named shareholder, and on behalf of all shareholders adversely affected by the firm's actions.
Empirical evidence shows that most M&A lawsuits are filed as class actions. For example,
Krishnan et al. (2012) find, using a sample of M&A lawsuits, that 87.6% are class action suits,
whereas only 3.4% are derivative suits.6 Similarly, Crutchley et al. (2015) report that M&As and
earnings management are the most commonly cited reasons for federal class action suits.
M&A lawsuits are usually filed as class actions because, often, only a minority “class” of
shareholders is directly affected by managerial wrongdoing during an acquisition. Furthermore,
as a result of the personal loss, shareholders are more likely to seek financial remedy for
themselves, rather than for the corporation. For example, Hewlett-Packard (HP) completed its
acquisition of British software company Autonomy for USD 10.2 billion on August 18, 2011.
About 15 months later, on November 20, 2012, HP disclosed that it had a USD 8.8 billion charge
related to the acquisition of Autonomy, with over USD 5 billion due to accounting irregularities
at Autonomy. The accounting irregularities were known to HP officers, but were concealed
from the investing public. As a result, a class action was filed “on behalf of all persons who
purchased common stock of Hewlett-Packard Company between August 19, 2011, and
November 20, 2012, inclusive.”7

6

Shareholders prefer to bring class actions to challenge M&A transactions because derivative lawsuits involve
several procedural hurdles. Most importantly, financial recoveries from a derivative lawsuit go to the corporate
treasury rather than to the shareholders. The limited use of derivative lawsuits makes the exogenous variation in
shareholder litigation rights generated by UD laws less useful in our research setting, because UD laws only make it
difficult to initiate derivative suits.
7
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1049/HPQ00_03/20121126_f01c_12CV05980.pdf
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Based on the above discussion, we examine how shareholders’ litigation rights affect
managers’ acquisition decisions. Our experimental design exploits a ruling of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals on July 2, 1999 that resulted in a reduced threat of class action litigation.
Under U.S. federal rules for civil procedures, shareholders have the right to sue a firm through a
securities class action for alleged violations of federal or state securities laws. Although
undertaking legal actions against those responsible for misdeeds is a civil right, it is also true
that frivolous lawsuits incur unnecessary social costs. As a result, the U.S. Congress enacted the
PSLRA in 1995 to prevent plaintiffs from filing weak or frivolous lawsuits. The reform made it
more difficult for shareholders to initiate a securities class action lawsuit. Under the PSLRA, to
legally form a class, plaintiffs must identify particular facts giving rise to a “strong inference”
that the defendants acted “with the required state of mind” for fraud (Levine and Pritchard,
1998; Johnson et al., 2001). Although the PSLRA has contributed to a less litigious environment
for all firms, the pleading standards of the law, as a practical matter, were interpreted
differently by various U.S. circuit courts. Here, the interpretation by the Ninth Circuit Court in
the Silicon Graphics case, In Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation on July 2, 1999 is the
most stringent. The Ninth Circuit ruling requires that, prior to forming a class, plaintiffs must
establish that the defendant acted with “deliberate recklessness” when making the
misrepresentation that gave rise to the claim. In other circuits, proving “mere recklessness” is
sufficient. This remarkable decision was largely unanticipated (Johnson et al., 1999), and has
since been applied to all securities class actions filed with the Ninth Circuit Court. Crane and
Koch (2018) show that, after the ruling, the number of class actions in the Ninth Circuit dropped

13
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by 43%, whereas it increased by 14% in the other circuits. Thus, we consider the Ninth Circuit
ruling an exogenous shock that reduced the threat of shareholder litigation in M&As.
2.4. Hypothesis development
It is well recognized in the finance literature that, in the absence of corporate
governance, managers do not always make acquisitions that maximize shareholder value. For
example, Jensen (1986) suggests that managers have an incentive to expand their firms beyond
the optimal size to increase the resources under their control, and Masulis et al. (2007) show
that managers in poorly governed firms are most likely to be responsible for empire-building
acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. A securities class action litigation provides a
mechanism by which shareholders can sue management in the event of managerial misconduct,
such as self-serving acquisitions. Recent studies document that the threat of such litigation
plays an important role in governance, limiting managers from introducing governance
provisions that are prone to agency problems, and encouraging voluntary disclosure (Appel,
2019; Houston et al., 2019). Given these prior findings, we expect the threat of shareholder
litigation to be a useful governance tool that limits managers from pursuing self-serving
acquisitions at the expense of shareholder wealth. Thus, we hypothesize that, since the Ninth
Circuit ruling, which reduced the threat of shareholder litigation, managers are more likely to
conduct self-serving acquisitions, leading to weaker acquirer returns.
H1: All else being equal, after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, acquiring firms
headquartered in Ninth Circuit states experienced lower CARs around M&A announcements
compared to firms headquartered in other states.

14
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We next examine the ways in which managers conduct self-serving acquisitions. Jensen
(1986) suggests that managers have an incentive to increase the resources under their control
by expanding their firms, and studies have shown that they often do so with the help of
overvalued equity. For example, Louis (2004) shows that acquiring firms often overstate their
earnings in the quarter before stock-based acquisitions to try to use overvalued equity as a
form of payment. Moeller et al. (2005) find that large-loss bidders have significantly higher
market-to-book ratios, and finance their deals with significantly higher equity. These findings
are consistent with Jensen’s (2005) suggestion that the significant value destruction for
acquirers can be explained by the agency costs of overvalued equity. Thus, we hypothesize that
managers in Ninth Circuit states are likely to acquire larger targets and use more stock financing
in M&As after the Ninth Circuit ruling.
H2a: All else being equal, after the ruling, firms headquartered in states under the jurisdiction
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are more likely to acquire large targets compared to firms
headquartered in other states.
H2b: All else being equal, after the ruling, firms headquartered in states under the jurisdiction
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are more likely to use stock as the payment method
compared to firms headquartered in other states.
Finally, we investigate the type of firm that is most likely to be affected by the Ninth
Circuit ruling. Shareholder litigation is unlikely to be needed as an external governance
mechanism in firms with good internal corporate governance. In such firms, through constant
monitoring, the board of directors and institutional blockholders can identify and prevent
managers from conducting self-serving acquisitions. In contrast, we expect the threat of
shareholder litigation to play a very important governance role in firms with poor corporate
governance. In such firms, managers can more easily conduct self-serving acquisitions, and the
15
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threat of shareholder litigation is one of the only ways to prevent them from doing so. Thus, we
hypothesize that the threat of shareholder litigation has a greater effect on the acquisition
performance of firms with poor corporate governance.
H3: All else being equal, the effect of lower ex ante class action litigation risk on M&A
performance is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance practices.
2.5. Research design
To examine how the reduced threat of shareholder litigation affects acquisition
performance (H1), we estimate the following difference-in-differences (DID) model:
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +2)𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 +
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1)

where t denotes the year, i denotes the firm, j denotes the industry, and k denotes the
incorporation state. The dependent variable, 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (−2, +2)𝑖,𝑡+1 , is the five-day CAR centered
on the acquisition announcement date. Following Masulis et al. (2007), we calculate abnormal
stock returns by estimating the market model for each acquirer over a 200-day period, ending
11 days before the announcement date (–210, –11), using the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) value-weighted return as the benchmark market index. The indicator variable
Treat differentiates and controls for differences between the treatment and control groups;
this variable takes the value one when the firm is located in a Ninth Circuit state, and zero
otherwise. Then, Post is a time dummy, taking the value one for fiscal years after 1999, and
zero for years 1996 to 1999. We do not include observations from years prior to 1996 because
the PSLRA in 1995 significantly affected the litigation environment governing securities class
actions. The DID coefficient of interest used to identify the difference in the treatment effect

16
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resulting from the Ninth Circuit ruling is denoted as 𝛽. We also include a set of control
measures, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , identified in prior studies as firm and deal characteristics that are likely to affect
a firm’s acquisition decisions. In addition, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 capture time and industry fixed
effects, respectively. Following recent literature on the effects of state laws, we include firm
incorporation state fixed effects, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘 , and cluster the standard errors at the headquarters
state level in all regressions to account for differences in incorporation and state-level laws and
regulations related to a firm’s headquarters (Gormley and Matsa, 2017; Houston et al., 2019).
We also construct a control group of firms (located outside of the Ninth Circuit) that are
matched to the treatment group (located in the Ninth Circuit) to ensure that the difference in
acquisition performance between the treatment and control firms is not caused by crosssectional heterogeneity. We use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to identify a
control firm for each treatment firm. Specifically, we first estimate a probit model using
acquisition observations to predict the likelihood that a firm is headquartered in the Ninth
Circuit states (Treatment). The dependent variable takes the value one if the firm is
headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states, and the independent variables include all
control variables used in this study (these variables are described in detail in section 3.2). We
obtain the predicted propensity score from this probit model. We then match, without
replacement, each treatment firm with a control firm, based on the closest propensity score. To
obtain closer matches, we use the caliper matching method and match within a caliper of 0.5%
as the maximum distance between the two groups. We then use the propensity-score matched
sample to re-run our baseline test.

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313

Next, to test whether the reduced threat of shareholder litigation leads managers to
acquire larger targets (H2a) or to use stock as the method of payment (H2b), we use the same
set of control variables as in equation (1). In testing H2a, we replace the dependent variable
with the relative deal size. In testing H2b, we use a probit regression and replace the dependent
variable with a stock financing indicator, which takes the value one if 80% or more of the
acquisition is funded by stock, and zero otherwise.
There is a concern when testing the choices of deal size and payment method separately
that they may not be determined separately. If so, our findings might be spurious owing to the
correlation in the error terms of the latter two regressions. To address this concern, we employ
a two-stage probit least squares model (PSLM), because one of the endogenous variables (i.e.,
relative deal size; referred to here as RelSize) is continuous, and the other (i.e., Stock80%) is
binomial. The PSLM essentially runs two two-stage model regressions to account for the
simultaneity. Models (1) and (2) represent the two first-stage regressions, and Models (3) and
(4) represent the two second-stage regressions. We follow Keshk (2003) to estimate the
models.8
Models (1) and (4):
First stage: RelSize = f(Firm governance, Institutional ownership, No. of blockholders, control
variables)
Second stage: Pr(Stock80%=1) = f(control variables, Inst_RelSize)
Models (2) and (3):
8

The results are weaker, but qualitatively similar when we apply a standard bivariate probit model without regard
for any potential simultaneity bias. These additional results are available upon request. We thank an anonymous
reviewer for suggesting this econometric improvement.
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First stage: Pr(Stock80%=1) = f(Leverage, Stock price runup, control variables)
Second stage: Relsize = f(control variables, Inst_Stock80%)
The variables Inst_RelSize and Inst_Stock80% are estimated from the first-stage models,
and are included as instruments in the second-stage models. The rationale for our use of the
set of governance variables in Models (1) and (4) is that we regard RelSize as a proxy variable
for the empire building associated with corporate governance quality. Similarly, the rationale
for our use of Leverage and Stock price runup in Models (2) and (3) is closely tied to the choice
of payment method.
Lastly, to examine whether the effect of lower ex ante class action litigation risk on
acquisition performance is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance practices, we
estimate our baseline equation (1) conditional on standard proxies for firm corporate
governance. We measure corporate governance using the following four proxies: the E-index,
institutional monitoring, CEO ownership, and CEO duality.
3. Data sources and variable construction
3.1. Data sources
To examine the post-1995 reform period before and after the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruling, we obtain a sample of corporate acquisitions for the period between 1996 and
2003 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) M&A database. We require a minimum deal
value of USD 1 million, and include only those deals for which the acquiring firm controls less
than 50% of the target's stock before the announcement, but owns 100% of the target's stock
after the transaction. We obtain accounting data from Compustat, financial market data from
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the CRSP, and governance data from ExecuComp and Riskmetrics. Our final sample consists of
2,549 acquisitions.
3.2. Firm and deal characteristics
Following the acquisition literature, we control for a vector of firm and deal
characteristics that may affect a firm's acquisition decisions. The variable definitions are
provided in Appendix 1. Our firm-level controls include ln(assets), leverage, Tobin’s Q, free cash
flow, sales growth, CEO delta, CEO overconfidence, corporate governance quality, and
institutional investor monitoring. We control for firm size, corporate governance quality, and
institutional investor monitoring because managers in large firms, poorly governed firms, and
firms with lower institutional investor monitoring are more entrenched and, hence, are more
likely to make self-serving acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007). We control for leverage and free
cash flow because, as suggested by Jensen (1986), managers in firms with low leverage and
high free cash flow are likely to engage in empire building. Tobin’s Q and sales growth control
for market valuation and firm growth opportunities, respectively. We control for CEO delta
because, as noted by Minnick et al. (2011), managers with high delta compensation perform
better in acquisitions. We control for CEO overconfidence because Malmendier and Tate (2003)
show that overconfident CEOs make investment decisions in a different manner to other CEOs.
All firm characteristics are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition
announcement. Our deal-level controls include stock price run-up; relative deal size; crossborder, cross-industry, and tender deal indicators; method of payment; target’s public status;
high-tech deal indicator; and merger wave. We need to control for stock price runup because it
could affect the choice of financing and subsequent announcement returns. We control for
20
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relative deal size because Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquirers perform worse in large deals.
We control for cross-border, cross-industry, and tender deal indicators because these deals
may be conducted for strategic rather than purely financial purposes. We control for method of
payment because acquirers experience higher announcement returns when paying cash, owing
to the adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984). We control for the target’s public
status because acquirers capture a liquidity discount when buying private targets (Fuller et al.,
2002). We control for high-tech deals because our sample period falls within the tech bubble,
which could bias our findings. Finally, we control for merger wave because acquisitions are
often overvalued during such waves (Rhodes-Kroph and Viswanathan, 2004).
Following Jenter and Lewellen (2015), we combine multiple governance measures into a
broader index of governance quality. The set of measures we use includes CEO duality, board
independence, and an entrenchment index (E-index). To construct the broader index, we split
each of the governance measures into two groups, with higher values of board independence,
lower E-index values, and a lack of CEO duality indicating better governance. Then, we
cumulate the ranks (0–1), which we divide by the number of measures available for the firmyear to obtain the governance index score.9
Table 1 describes the sample firm distribution, and presents the variable summary
statistics. Firms in Ninth Circuit states form the treatment group, and those in other states
represent the control group. Panel A of Table 1 compares the number of acquisitions between
the treatment and control groups, and Figure 1 illustrates the time-series trend. We do not
9

We check whether our result holds when we include the E-index and board characteristics separately. Although
we lose 864 observations doing so, we find qualitatively similar results to those shown in Table 3.
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observe a significant trend in the number of acquisitions conducted by the treatment and
control firms. Panel B of Table 1 partitions our sample of acquisitions by the industry in which
the acquirer operates. Of the acquisitions made by firms in Ninth Circuit states, 54% are
conducted by acquirers operating in the business equipment industry, accounting for 376
acquisitions. Of the acquisitions made by firms outside the Ninth Circuit states firms, 26% are
conducted by acquirers operating in the business equipment industry.
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Figure 1 here]

Panel C provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study. We present the
mean values of the variables for the treatment and control groups, as well as their mean
differences. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We find
that 24% of the acquisitions in our sample are made by firms headquartered in Ninth Circuit
states, which allows for a significant number of treated firms in our empirical setting. The
average acquirer in our sample has a leverage ratio of 22%, a Tobin’s Q of 2.55, and free cash
flow of 4%, consistent with the figures reported by other recent M&A studies (e.g., Yim, 2013;
Huang et al., 2014). The deal characteristics show that 21% of the acquisitions are cross-border
deals, 44% are cross-industry deals, and 33% are funded entirely by cash. We find that firm and
deal characteristics differ significantly between firms located within the Ninth circuit (the
treatment firms) and firms located in other states (the control firms). This could be due to
industry clustering in certain states. For example, tech firms tend to be headquartered in
California. To take into account any systematic differences between the two groups of firms, we
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control for year, industry, and state fixed effects in all regressions, conduct estimations based
on a matched sample, and perform a battery of sensitivity analyses.
4. Shareholder litigation rights and announcement returns
4.1. Univariate results
In this section, we analyze the effect of shareholder litigation rights on deal
announcement returns. We first compare the univariate results for the treatment and control
groups. Table 2 shows that before the Ninth Circuit ruling, firms in Ninth Circuit states exhibited
an average five-day CAR of 0.75% around the acquisition announcement date. After the ruling,
the average CAR decreased to -0.34% for these firms. This change is statistically significant,
indicating that the reduced threat of shareholder litigation decreased the average five-day CAR
by 1.09 percentage points. In contrast, for firms located outside the Ninth Circuit states, we find
that the average five-day CAR decreases by only 0.29 percentage points after the ruling.
Furthermore, this change is not statistically significant. The univariate results also show that
before (after) the ruling, the average five-day CAR for the treatment firms was 0.12 (0.68)
percentage points higher (lower) than that of the control firms; however, these differences are
nonsignificant. Overall, the univariate results suggest that firms in Ninth Circuit states have
experienced lower announcement returns since the Ninth Circuit ruling. We next conduct
multivariate tests to further examine the effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on acquisition
performance.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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4.2. Baseline results
4.2.1. Full sample
Table 3 reports the multivariate test results for the effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on
acquisition performance. First, we report the estimation results without control variables in
Column (1). Here, we find that the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is negative and
significant at the 1% level. We then add the firm-level controls to the regression and report the
results in Column (2). Again, the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is negative and significant
at the 1% level. The coefficients of our control variables exhibit the expected signs: 1) CEOs who
receive higher equity-based compensation have a greater incentive to make value-enhancing
acquisitions (Minnick et al., 2011); 2) managers in larger firms are more entrenched and,
therefore, more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007); 3)
overvalued firms (higher Tobin’s Q) are likely to reveal their true value to the market on the
announcement of an acquisition (Moeller et al., 2004); and 4) acquirers do better when paying
with cash, owing to the well-documented adverse selection problem (Myers and Maliuf, 1984).
Our results suggest that a reduced threat of shareholder litigation is associated with lower
announcement returns. In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient estimate of Treat ×
Post indicates that after the ruling, acquirers in Ninth Circuit states experienced announcement
returns that were 1.32 percentage points lower than those of acquirers located in other states.
This negative market reaction represents a loss of USD 28.19 million in shareholder value for
the median Ninth Circuit firm in our sample. Overall, these results support hypothesis H1. 10

10

To verify that the change in acquisition performance is not related to any other events prior to the ruling, we run
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[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
Because M&As do not take place randomly, our findings could be driven spuriously by
nonrandom data. Thus, in Column (3), we report the results of a Heckman two-stage model that
addresses such sample selection bias. In the first stage, we run a probit model using a set of
firm characteristics to estimate the acquisition likelihood, and then calculate the inverse Mills
ratio from the probit model residuals.11 We include the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage
regression. The results confirm that selection bias has little influence on our findings.
To control for time-varying industry characteristics (e.g., investment opportunities) that
might affect corporate acquisition performance, we run the model with industry-year fixed
effects. A drawback of this approach is that the coefficient of M&A wave is not estimated
because it is measured as the annual number of acquisitions in a given industry, resulting in
perfect collinearity. The results reported in Column (4) of Table 3 show a negative coefficient
estimate for Treat × Post that is statistically significant at the 10% level. In summary, we confirm
that the acquisition announcement returns of firms in Ninth Circuit states have decreased since
the ruling.
The success of a DID estimation rests on the parallel trend assumption being satisfied,
which requires similar trends in acquirer announcement returns for firms headquartered within
and outside the Ninth Circuit before the Ninth Circuit ruling. Figure 2 shows that these trends

a dynamic regression in which we include lead and lagged effects of the ruling. Though not reported here, the
results show that a significantly lower CAR(-2, +2) appears only in 2000, a year after the ruling. This confirms that
the negative reaction was not related to prior events and that the ruling was unexpected.
11
The results of the probit model are reported in Appendix 2.
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are similar, suggesting that the parallel trend is satisfied. To formally test the parallel trend
assumption, we take a sample of 22 treatment and 77 control firms that conducted acquisitions
in both 1996 and 1999, and compare the trends in the acquisition performance (difference
between CAR experienced in 1999 and CAR experienced in 1996) of the firms in the two groups.
We do not find any significant differences between these trends in the pre-event period (t-stat
= 0.505), indicating that the parallel trend assumption is satisfied.
4.2.2 Propensity-score matched sample
Our comparison of the firm and deal characteristics between the treatment and control
groups reported in Table 1 shows several significant differences. Thus, to confirm that our
findings are not driven spuriously by differences in firm or deal characteristics, we use the PSM
method to identify a control firm for each treatment firm (the matching methodology is
described in detail in section 2.5). After the matching, we identify 511 matched pairs of
treatment–control acquisitions, with a total of 1022 acquisitions. Panel A of Table 4 shows that
all firm and deal characteristics are well-matched between the treatment and control firms.
Using the matched sample only, we rerun our baseline regression; the results are reported in
Panel B of Table 4. We find that the coefficient of Treat × Post is -2.180, and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Overall, our finding is robust to sample selection bias.
[Insert Table 4 here]
5. Underlying mechanisms
5.1. Empire building with overvalued equity
We expect that the reduced threat of class action litigation for managers of firms
incorporated in Ninth Circuit states will encourage these managers to manipulate earnings
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before acquisitions in order to boost the firm’s stock price, and then use the overvalued stock
to fund empire-building acquisitions. Our view is shared by Jensen (2005), who suggests that a
high level of acquirer value destruction can be explained by the agency costs of overvalued
equity. This view is also supported by the empirical findings of Moeller et al. (2005), who show
that large-loss bidders have significantly higher market-to-book ratios, and are more likely to
finance their deals using equity.
To test our predictions, we first examine whether managers in Ninth Circuit states are
more likely to make larger acquisitions and use equity financing after the Ninth Circuit ruling.
Table 5 reports the results. The ordinary least squares regression results reported in Column (1)
show that managers in Ninth Circuit states did begin acquiring larger firms after it became more
difficult for shareholders to litigate. In Column (2), the probit regression results show that these
managers are also more likely to use equity financing after the ruling. These findings support
hypotheses H2a and H2b.
[Insert Table 5 here]
However, the choices of deal size and payment method may not be determined
separately. If so, our findings might be spurious owing to the correlation in the error terms of
the two regressions. To address this concern, we employ a two-stage PSLM (see section 2.5).
The results of the PSLM model estimations are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. We
confirm that the reduced threat of class action litigation increases the likelihood of stockfinanced acquisitions and the acquisition of relatively large target firms.
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5.2. Subsample tests with corporate governance mechanisms
Next, we conduct cross-sectional tests to identify the types of firms that completed valuedestroying deals after the threat of class action litigation was eased. Shareholder litigation is
designed to provide recourse if all other governance mechanisms fail. Hence, the external
governance mechanism of shareholder litigation is unlikely to be needed in firms with good
internal corporate governance, because such firms can discipline their managers before the
shareholder litigation stage is reached. In contrast, we expect that the threat of class action
litigation plays an important governance role in firms with poor internal corporate governance
because, in these firms, the threat of shareholder litigation provides one of the only ways to
prevent managers from conducting self-serving acquisitions. Thus, we hypothesize that when
the Ninth Circuit ruling reduced the threat of shareholder litigation, managers in firms with
weaker corporate governance became more likely to conduct self-serving value-destroying
acquisitions, because they had more freedom to do so. To test this hypothesis, we conduct DID
estimations conditional on standard proxies for firm corporate governance. Consistent with the
literature, we measure corporate governance using four proxies: the E-index, institutional
monitoring, CEO ownership, and CEO duality.
The E-index, first introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009), is based on six of the 24 antitakeover provisions included in the G-index originally constructed by Gompers et al. (2003),
where a higher value corresponds to weaker corporate governance. Using the G-index as a
measure of corporate governance, Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions are more likely to conduct empire-building acquisitions that destroy
shareholder value. Bebchuk et al. (2009) determine that the six governance provisions in the E28
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index matter most in terms of excessive management power. We classify firms as having
stronger (weaker) corporate governance if the firm has an E-index score of two or less (above
two). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the results. We find that the value destruction
stems from firms with higher E-index scores. This finding is expected, because the managers of
these poorly governed firms located within Ninth Circuit states are likely to have had greater
freedom to conduct self-serving acquisitions since the ruling.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Recent evidence shows that institutional investors play a significant role in corporate
governance. Cheng at al. (2010) show that class actions led by institutional investors increased
between 1995 and 2004, and appeared to be effective in disciplining management. Aggarwal et
al. (2015) show that institutional investors value their votes and use the proxy process to affect
corporate governance. McCahery et al. (2016) find that 45% of the institutional investors they
surveyed have had private discussions with the corporate board without management present.
Furthermore, Liu et al. (2019) find that institutional investor monitoring strengthens board
oversight. We measure institutional monitoring as the number of institutional owners
(blockholders) that hold more than 5% of a firm’s shares, because we expect that institutional
investors who own larger portions of a firm’s shares will have a greater incentive and ability to
discipline managers. The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, and support
hypothesis H3. Here, we find that the value destruction is concentrated in acquirers with fewer
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blockholders, because managers in these Ninth Circuit firms are more likely to conduct selfserving acquisitions, given the reduction in the threat of shareholder litigation.12
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, larger managerial ownership
reduces agency costs significantly, thus reflecting a better corporate governance mechanism.
Although further studies show that this negative relationship is nonlinear, we concur with
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014), who show that firms with higher CEO ownership exhibit
better stock performance. They suggest that managerial ownership can also be considered an
internal corporate governance device that is distinct from the external governance mechanisms
studied by Gompers et al. (2003). Thus, we use CEO ownership as our third proxy for corporate
governance quality. Assuming the positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm
value holds, CEOs with greater exposure to the firm’s stock are less likely to undertake valuedestroying acquisitions. The results in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 suggest that the value
destruction caused by the reduced threat of litigation is a significant issue for firms with lower
CEO ownership.
As a final proxy for corporate governance, we use CEO duality. Finkelstein and D'Aveni
(1994) consider CEO duality a “double-edged sword,” owing to the trade-off between the
effectiveness of having a CEO who also serves as the chairperson of the board of directors, and
the independent board monitoring made possible by separating these two roles. According to
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), CEO duality is beneficial to shareholders. In

12

On a separate note, the difference between the estimated coefficients for firms with low and high numbers of
blockholders is not statistically significant, implying that our finding is not driven by a shift in ownership to
institutional investors after the ruling documented by Crane and Koch (2018).
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contrast, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that CEO duality hinders the
monitoring role of the board of directors. The relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance remains inconclusive, and determining it lies outside the scope of these two
theories (Krause et al., 2014). Here, we lean toward the agency theory point of view. Inspired
by Masulis et al. (2007), who find a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and
bidder returns, we expect a CEO who also chairs the board of directors to have more
opportunities to pursue their personal interests when implementing M&A transactions. As such,
we predict that the value destruction related to the reduced threat of shareholder litigation is
significant in firms where the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors. The results
in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 support our prediction.
6. Additional evidence and sensitivity analyses
In this section, we conduct three additional tests related to the Ninth Circuit ruling, as
well as a battery of sensitivity analyses on the effect of the ruling on acquirer announcement
returns.
6.1. Managerial forecasting error with lower threat of shareholder litigation
Studies have shown that the threat of litigation affects financial reporting behavior. For
example, Hopkins (2018) investigates whether the risk of securities class actions affects the
level of misreporting. He finds that, since the Ninth Circuit ruling, managers of firms in Ninth
Circuit states have issued more restatements than those of firms in other states. Following this
line of thought, we expect that the reduced threat of shareholder litigation encourages
managers to issue material misstatements around acquisition announcements. Using
managerial earnings per share (EPS) forecasting data from I/B/E/S (formerly First Call), we test
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whether the reduced threat of litigation causes managers to be overly optimistic when
announcing future earnings. To ensure managers’ earnings forecasts are linked to an upcoming
M&A, we limit our analysis to annual management EPS forecasts one year prior to M&A deals.13
Following prior management forecast studies (e.g., Feng et al., 2009), we construct two
variables to measure managerial EPS forecasting error: Abs(Fore_Error) and Fore_Error.
Abs(Fore_Error) is the absolute value of Fore_Error, the management’s EPS forecast minus the
actual EPS, divided by the lagged calendar-end stock price. We report the results in Panel A of
Table 7. We find that the reduction in the threat of shareholder litigation after the ruling
increases management optimism when future earnings are announced. More specifically, we
find that, after the ruling, management earnings forecasting errors announced in firms located
in Ninth Circuit states increased by 2.15 cents compared with those of firms in other states. The
increased margin seems mostly driven by inflated EPS estimations in forecasting. After the
ruling, firms located in Ninth Circuit states report EPS forecasts 1.93 cents higher than those of
firms in other states. Overall, our findings suggest that the reduced threat of class action
litigation encourages managers to be overly optimistic in terms of future earnings
announcements surrounding M&A deals. These results are consistent with the findings of
Hopkins (2018), who shows that firms affected by the ruling exhibit higher probabilities of
restatement than those not affected by the ruling do.
[Insert Table 7 here]

13

We also tried the quarterly EPS forecast, but failed to find significant results. Please see the discussion on the
limitations of quarterly EPS forecast data in Ajinkya et al. (2005).
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6.2. Earnings management with a lower threat of shareholder litigation
M&As and earnings management are the two most commonly cited reasons for federal
class action suits (Crutchley et al., 2015), and studies have found that these two reasons often
co-exist. For example, Louis (2004) shows that acquiring firms often overstate earnings in the
quarter prior to a stock swap announcement in order to boost their stock prices. Furthermore,
Gong et al. (2008) find that acquirers who manipulate their earnings before stock offers are
more likely to attract subsequent lawsuits. Thus, we expect the reduced threat of shareholder
litigation encourages managers to manipulate earnings before an acquisition, because they
have a lower probability of being caught, and to then use this overvalued stock to fund empirebuilding acquisitions. We examine acquirers’ earnings management using a modified Jones
model and quarterly financial data from Compustat to estimate abnormal accruals in the
quarter prior to a deal announcement (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Note that the sample
size shrinks significantly owing to missing quarterly values for the variables required to calculate
the abnormal accruals. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7. Consistent with our
predictions, we find that, after the ruling, compared with managers of firms in other states,
those of firms in Ninth Circuit states manage earnings significantly upward in the quarter before
an acquisition; however, this relationship holds only in the case of stock offers. In summary, our
results show that the reduced threat of class action litigation has given managers greater
freedom to conduct self-serving acquisitions using overvalued equity, which destroys
shareholder value.
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6.3. Probability of CEO turnover
As a final test related to the Ninth Circuit ruling, we ask whether the reduced threat of
class action litigation affects the likelihood of CEO replacement. Prior research has documented
the role of shareholder litigation in executive and director discipline in defendant firms. For
example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) report that outside directors are likely to lose their other
outside directorships after a lawsuit, and Humphery-Jenner (2012) finds that shareholder class
action litigation increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Given the documented disciplinary
role of shareholder litigation, we expect the reduced threat of litigation after the Ninth Circuit
ruling to increase managerial entrenchment, which, in turn, decreases the probability of
termination. This hypothesis is consistent with Appel’s (2019) finding that reduced shareholder
litigation rights allow managers to adopt classified boards, supermajority voting requirements,
and poison pills.
To investigate whether the Ninth Circuit ruling affects the likelihood of CEO replacement,
especially when CEOs are engaged in value-decreasing M&As, we merge our sample of
acquirers with the Execucomp database. The merged database is used to examine the
probability of CEO turnover in firms involved in value-decreasing M&As between 1996 and
2003, around the time of the ruling. We obtain CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover data
from Professor Andrea Eisfeldt’s website.14 Forced CEO turnovers are identified based on news

14

The limitation of studying CEO turnover is that little is known about why CEOs are replaced. It might be that,
upon mutual agreement, the departure is announced for other reasons (e.g., health issues), even though the real
reason is poor performance. Parrino (1997) and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) note that a planned CEO departure is
announced at least six months prior to the succession. They classify a CEO replacement as a forced turnover if
news articles report “a CEO is fired or left the firm due to policy differences or pressure from the board of
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stories published in Factiva.15 For this analysis, we limit our sample to firms that engage in
acquisitions. Thus, we predict the probability of CEO replacement conditional on acquisition
performance. Specifically, we set up the following regression:
Pr(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑀&𝐴, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠),

(2)

where Turnover represents CEO Turnover or Forced CEO Turnover, which are indicators that
take the value one if a CEO is replaced or forced out, respectively, within two years of an
acquisition, and zero otherwise. Then, NegM&A is an indicator that takes the value one if the
average five-day announcement return is negative, and zero otherwise. The regression includes
observations at the firm-year level. We expect the coefficient of Treat x Post x NegM&A to be
negative, implying that a lower likelihood of shareholder litigation reduces CEO replacement in
the case of negative M&A performance.
Panel C of Table 7 shows the results of the logistic regressions. In Column (1), we find a
negative coefficient of Treat x Post x NegM&A on the probability of CEO turnover after the
ruling for firms in Ninth Circuit states, compared with that of firms in other states; however, the
coefficient is not statistically significant. Column (2) presents the marginal effect of each
variable. Column (3) shows that, after the ruling, the likelihood of forced CEO replacement is
affected significantly by engaging in value-decreasing M&As (NegM&A). From an economic
viewpoint, after the ruling, the likelihood of forced CEO replacement decreases by 3.4
percentage points when M&A announcement returns are negative, as shown in Column (4).

directors.” While we are unable to trace the true reason why a CEO departs, we assume that an M&A failure is a
critical event that results in CEO replacement.
15
https://sites.google.com/site/andrealeisfelft/. See Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) for a detailed explanation of the
information-collection process.
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Overall, these findings suggest that the reduced threat of being fired since the ruling
significantly reduces CEO turnover, even for firms with poor acquisition performance. This is
one of the reasons why managers in Ninth Circuit states can conduct value-destroying, empirebuilding acquisitions, providing further evidence that the threat of shareholder litigation plays a
monitoring role in the dismissal of managers who perform poorly.
6.4. Sensitivity analyses
Finally, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to further confirm the documented
effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on acquirer returns. First, we address the concern that our
results may be driven by the burst of the tech bubble, which occurred during our study period.
We conduct three separate robustness tests to address this concern: 1) we exclude tech firms
from our baseline regression, using an indicator that takes the value one if the acquirer and
target firms are both from high-tech industries (Loughran and Ritter, 2004); 2) we exclude the
period 1999 to 2000 from our sample; and 3) we exclude firms located in Silicon Valley. We
obtain the address of a firm’s headquarters from Compustat and use the city name to identify
whether the firm is located in Silicon Valley.16 The results reported in Columns (1) to (3) in Panel
A of Table 8 show that our finding still holds. To further address the concern that the tech
bubble may drive our results, we extend our sample to 2015. The unreported results are
qualitatively similar to our original results, and are consistent with the finding of Cox et al.
(2009) that, despite numerous efforts by the Supreme Court, differences in pleading standards
persist across circuits.
16

A firm is identified as being in Silicon Valley if it is located in one of the following cities in California: San Jose,
Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Cupertino, Santa Clara, Mountain View, or Sunnyvale
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silicon_Valley).

36

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313

[Insert Table 8 here]
Second, we employ a border analysis, following Holmes (1998), to address the possible
selection bias, because acquisition decisions are typically not made in random places as firms
do not randomly select their locations. We obtain zip codes (from the U.S. census) for counties
that share state borders with Ninth Circuit states and other states, and repeat our analysis for
the firms located around the state borders. That is, the treated firms are those with
headquarters in Montana, Idaho, Nevada, or Arizona, and the control firms are those with
headquarters in Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming, or North Dakota. Column (4) in Panel A of Table
8 reports the results. Firms headquartered in these states completed only 50 M&A transactions
during the period 1996–2003; thus, we include only industry fixed effects in the regression in
order to avoid multicollinearity. The coefficient of Treat × Post remains negative and significant.
Third, Compustat does not capture headquarter relocations because it backfills firm
addresses. To ensure that the locations of the firms’ headquarters are accurate, we obtain
information on relocations from the firms’ SEC Form 10-K filings to update our sample firms’
addresses. We rerun our baseline regressions and one of the robustness tests, excluding firms
in Silicon Valley. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported previously. The
results from the baseline model for the full sample in Column (5) are shown in Panel B of Table
8.
Fourth, UD laws have been shown to positively affect acquisition performance. Therefore,
we control for the staggered implementation of these laws (Chu and Zhao, 2019). Column (6) in
Panel B of Table 8 provides the results. We find that the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is
similar in magnitude to those in the main analysis, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Consistent with Chu and Zhao’s (2019) finding, the coefficient of UD Laws is positive, but is not
statistically significant.
Fifth, we control for other legal changes related to shareholder litigation and antitakeover provisions to ensure that these changes are not driving our results. Following Karpoff
and Wittry (2018), we control for various state anti-takeover laws, including control share
acquisition, business combination, fair price, directors’ duties, and poison-pill laws. Column (7)
in Panel B of Table 8 shows the results. After adding these control variables, we again find that
the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is similar in magnitude and significance to those in the
main analysis.
Sixth, several studies argue that shareholder litigation affects firms’ disclosure and
information environments. For example, Bourveau et al. (2018) find that firms increase their
disclosure significantly after UD laws that make it more difficult for shareholders to claim
derivative lawsuits. Houston et al. (2019) report that the threat of shareholder litigation
encourages voluntary disclosure practices. Similarly, Hopkins (2018) concludes that the threat
of shareholder litigation can discipline managers and deter financial misreporting. However,
Boone et al. (2019) show that, although managers increase their voluntary disclosure levels
owing to the reduced threat of shareholder litigation, firms provide lower-quality financial
reporting overall after UD laws are passed. Another strand of the literature argues that
disclosure is related to M&A behavior. For example, Hope and Thomas (2008) conclude that
disclosure requirements limit managers’ abilities to engage in empire building. These studies
suggest that a reduced threat of shareholder litigation affects disclosure, which may, in turn,
affect M&A behavior. To address this concern, we control for two variables that capture a firm’s
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information quality: Restate and Ln(Analysts). Here, Restate is equal to one if a firm restates its
financial statements in a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise, and Ln(Analysts) is the logtransformed number of unique analysts (plus one) that issue a firm’s earnings forecasts.
Column (8) in Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. We find that the coefficient of Treat ×
Post remains negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, Restate is positively associated
with acquirer announcement returns, 17 whereas Ln(Analyst) is negatively associated with
acquirer announcement returns. However, these associations are nonsignificant.
Seventh, we repeat our baseline model analysis using a three-day event window. We
report the results using CAR (-1, +1) as an alternative dependent variable in Panel C of Table 8.
The coefficient of Treat × Post is still similar in magnitude and significance to those of the main
analysis.

7. Conclusion
It is well recognized in the M&A literature that, in the absence of strong corporate
governance, managers have an incentive to conduct empire-building acquisitions that destroy
shareholder value. Shareholder litigation rights, a governance mechanism designed to provide
recourse in the event that all other governance mechanisms fail, should theoretically play an
important external governance role in disciplining the managers of poorly governed firms, thus
increasing shareholder value. However, because many lawsuits are triggered by unexpected
decreases in stock prices, we often find that shareholder litigation in practice is simply a
17

Although this finding suggests that firms that restate results tend to exhibit higher positive announcement
returns, it cannot exclude the possibility that acquiring firms that exhibit better announcement returns are more
likely to restate their financial statements than are firms with worse announcement returns in a given fiscal year.
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method by which shareholders and lawyers extract wealth from defendant corporations.
Managers are therefore encouraged to conduct acquisitions that minimize downside risk rather
than maximizing shareholder value. As a result, the threat of shareholder litigation may also be
detrimental to shareholder value.
In this study, we specifically examine how the threat of class action litigation affects
managers’ acquisition decisions in order to determine whether shareholder litigation rights
serve as an effective governance mechanism that prevents managers from conducting selfserving acquisitions at the expense of shareholder value. To establish a causal relationship, we
use the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals July 2, 1999 ruling, In re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities
Litigation, which generated an exogenous reduction in shareholder class action litigation rights
for firms located in Ninth Circuit states.
The results of a DID analysis show that, after the ruling, firms located in Ninth Circuit
states experienced significantly lower deal announcement returns, especially for acquirers with
weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, we find that value destruction occurs as a result of
managers’ freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using equity that has been
overvalued via inflated earnings. Overall, we show that regulatory changes that reduce the
threat of class actions are not in the best interests of shareholders, because their collective
power to litigate serves as an important governance tool, particularly in the event of M&As. Our
empirical evidence suggests that the governance power provided by shareholder class action
litigation effectively reduces managers’ incentives to engage in empire building at the expense
of shareholder value.
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Figure 1. Acquisition activities
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This figure shows the number of acquisitions made by firms in Ninth Circuit states versus that of
firms in other circuits, before and after the Ninth Circuit Ruling. The Ninth Circuit ruling was
announced on July 2, 1999, as indicated by the reference line.
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Figure 2. Acquisition outcomes
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This figure shows the five-day cumulative abnormal returns experienced by acquirers in Ninth
Circuit states versus that of firms in other circuits, before and after the Ninth Circuit ruling. The
Ninth Circuit ruling was announced on July 2, 1999, as indicated by the reference line.
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Table 1
Sample distribution and summary statistics
This table presents the sample of firms by year and industry. Panel A reports the annual number of
acquisitions for the treatment and control groups, Panel B reports the number of acquisitions across
industries for the two groups, and Panel C reports the summary statistics for the main variables,
constructed from the sample of firms for the period 1996 to 2003. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.

Panel A. Acquisitions by Year
Number of acquisitions by treatment
firms

Number of acquisitions by
control firms

72
35
63
89
93
76
101
78

196
231
251
283
264
240
214
263

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Panel B. Acquisitions by Acquirer Industry
Number of acquisitions by treatment
firms

Number of acquisitions
by control firms

21
6
42
13
7
376
6
32
50
0
54

121
74
397
134
91
501
95
160
219
7
143

Consumer nondurables
Consumer durables
Manufacturing
Oil, gas, and coal
Chemical products
Business equipment
Telephone and television
Wholesale and retail
Healthcare
Finance
Other
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Panel C. Summary Statistics

Treat
Post
CAR (-2, +2) in %
CEO delta
CEO overconfidence
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
Tobin’s Q
Free cash flow
Sales growth
Firm governance
Institutional ownership
No. of blockholders
Stock price runup
Relative deal size
High tech
Cross border
Cross industry
Tender deal
All-cash deal
Private target
M&A wave

N

Mean

Q1

Std. dev.

Median

Q3

2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549
2,549

0.24
0.52
0.40
0.93
0.43
7.51
0.22
2.55
0.04
0.26
0.38
0.65
1.72
-0.04
0.12
0.29
0.21
0.44
0.08
0.33
0.38
5.10

0.00
0.00
–3.41
0.13
0.19
6.36
0.10
1.40
0.02
0.04
0.00
0.54
0.75
-0.33
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.98

0.43
0.50
7.20
1.82
0.29
1.61
0.16
2.05
0.08
0.54
0.32
0.17
1.21
0.50
0.25
0.45
0.41
0.50
0.27
0.47
0.49
4.45

0.00
0.00
0.23
0.33
0.43
7.32
0.22
1.84
0.05
0.13
0.33
0.67
1.75
-0.06
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.08

0.00
1.00
4.04
0.87
0.66
8.51
0.32
2.83
0.08
0.32
0.67
0.78
2.50
0.24
0.12
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
5.56

(1) Treat
(N = 607)
-0.57
0.12
1.34
0.52
7.14
0.17
3.43
0.04
0.42
0.43
0.64
1.72
-0.01
0.10
0.53
0.17
0.38
0.06
0.33
0.50
5.40
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(2) Control Diff [(1) – (2)]
(N = 1,942)
--0.51
0.07***
0.48
-0.36
0.80
0.54***
0.40
0.11***
7.62
-0.48***
0.24
-0.08***
2.27
1.16***
0.04
0.00
0.21
0.21***
0.37
0.06***
0.66
-0.02**
1.72
0.00
-0.04
0.03
0.13
-0.03**
0.22
0.31***
0.22
-0.05***
0.45
-0.07***
0.09
-0.02*
0.33
0.00
0.35
0.15***
5.00
0.40***

Table 2
Univariate analysis
This table presents the mean values of acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the
acquisition announcement date, CAR (-2,+2), for the treatment and control groups, as well as the
differences between the means of the two groups and within each group before and after the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling of July 2, 1999. The treatment group includes firms headquartered in
states under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court, and the control group includes firms in other
states. Statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels is indicated by * and ***, respectively. The tstatistics are reported in parentheses.
Treatment
CAR (–2, +2)

(1) Pre
(N = 256)
0.75
(1.63)

(2) Post
(N = 348)
-0.34
(-0.74)

Control
Diff [(2) – (1)]
-1.09*
(1.67)

(3) Pre
(N = 961)
0.63***
(2.92)

(4) Post Diff [(4) – (3)]
(N = 981)
0.34
-0.29
(1.50)
(0.92)

Diff [(1) – (3)] = 0.12 (-0.26)
Diff [(2) – (4)) = -0.68 (-1.32)
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Table 3
Threat of shareholder litigation and announcement returns
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on acquirer
announcement returns. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth
Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors, clustered by
acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
(1)

(2)

CAR (–2, +2)
-1.324***
-1.898***
(-2.96)
(-4.20)
0.311
1.046*
(0.61)
(1.86)
0.236***
0.323***
(2.85)
(3.64)
-0.256
-0.890
(-0.54)
(-1.61)
-0.462***
-0.463**
(-3.47)
(-2.62)
1.037
1.385
(0.83)
(0.94)
-0.154**
-0.131*
(-2.19)
(-1.89)
-0.706
-1.127
(-0.23)
(-0.34)
-0.102
-0.156
(-0.40)
(-0.63)
-0.387
-0.555
(-0.93)
(-1.04)
0.277
0.431
(0.21)
(0.35)
-0.201
-0.147
(-1.11)
(-0.84)
-1.670***
-1.665**
(-3.11)
(-2.62)
-1.808**
-1.929*
(-2.13)
(-1.87)
0.123
0.289
(0.28)
(0.64)
0.181
-0.004
(0.65)
(-0.01)
0.120
0.168
(0.27)
(0.49)
0.615*
0.519*

-1.260***
(-2.80)
0.183
(0.37)

Treat × Post
Treat

(3)

CEO delta
CEO overconfidence
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
Tobin’s Q
Free cash flow
Sales growth
Firm governance
Institutional ownership
No. of blockholders
Stock price runup
Relative deal size
Cross-border
Cross-industry

Tender deal
All-cash deal
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(4)

-1.211*
(-1.99)
0.760
(1.25)
0.300***
(2.87)
-0.988*
(-1.72)
-0.327
(-1.53)
0.445
(0.28)
-0.106
(-1.66)
-1.048
(-0.31)
-0.370*
(-1.69)
-0.727
(-1.44)
0.460
(0.30)
-0.145
(-0.70)
-1.966***
(-2.79)
-1.810
(-1.47)
0.295
(0.71)
0.216
(0.63)
0.324
(0.76)
0.548

(1.85)
-0.168
(-0.43)
-0.148
(-0.34)
-0.001
(-0.72)

Private target
High-tech
M&A wave
Inverse Mills ratio
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Industry-year FE
Incorporation state FE
Number of observations
R2

-0.010
(-0.01)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2,549
0.04

3.000
(1.23)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2,549
0.07

(1.69)
-0.169
(-0.47)
-0.307
(-0.69)
-0.002
(-1.18)
0.019
(0.01)
3.423
(0.99)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2,186
0.08
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(1.56)
0.155
(0.46)
-0.360
(-0.76)

-0.015
(-0.01)
6.276**
(2.12)
No
No
Yes
Yes
2,186
0.16

Table 4
Propensity score matching
This table presents the results for a two-stage model that uses propensity score matching (PSM) to
address sample selection bias. Panel A reports the post-match differences in the matching variables, and
Panel B presents the results from the baseline regression run only on the PSM matched sample. The tstatistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are
displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Panel A: Post-match differences
(1) Treat
(N=511)
CEO delta
0.99
CEO overconfidence
0.47
Ln(Assets)
7.16
Leverage
0.18
Tobin’s Q
2.83
Free cash flow
0.04
Sales growth
0.30
Firm governance
0.42
Institutional ownership
0.64
No. of blockholders
1.76
Stock price runup
0.02
Relative deal size
0.11
Cross border
0.19
Cross industry
0.41
Tender deal
0.07
All-cash deal
0.33
Private target
0.47
High tech
0.44
M&A wave
5.28
Panel B. Matched sample DID test results

(2) Control
(N=511)
0.97
0.49
7.13
0.18
2.78
0.04
0.30
0.41
0.65
1.85
0.03
0.11
0.19
0.41
0.07
0.32
0.47
0.43
5.20

Diff [(1) – (2)]

abs (t-statistics)

0.02
-0.02
0.03
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.01
-0.01
-0.09
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.08

0.18
0.99
0.30
0.05
0.36
0.03
0.02
0.17
0.61
1.18
0.11
0.13
0.16
0.13
0.00
0.33
0.06
0.31
1.31
(1)
CAR (-2, +2)
-2.180***
(-2.77)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
1022
0.119

Treat × Post
Controls and Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Year × Industry FE
Incorporation state FE
Number of observations
R2
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Table 5
Threat of shareholder litigation on relative deal size and method of payment
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on deal size and
payment method. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit
ruling of July 2, 1999. RelSize represents the relative deal size. Stock80% is an indicator variable equal to
one if 80% of the acquisition is funded using stock. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard
errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in
Appendix 1.

Treat × Post
Treat
CEO delta
CEO overconfidence
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
Tobin’s Q
Free cash flow
Sales growth
Firm governance
Institutional ownership
No. of blockholders
Stock price runup
Cross border
Cross industry
Tender deal

(1)
OLS
RelSize
0.046**
(2.01)
-0.027
(-1.49)
-0.001
(-0.19)
-0.040*
(-6.90)
-0.028***
(-6.42)
0.110***
(3.11)
-0.010***
(-2.93)
-0.005
(-.077)
0.002
(0.03)
10.013
(-0.89)
-0.163***
(-4.11)
0.022***
(3.88)
0.023***
(2.39)
-0.057***
(-4.84)
-0.039***
(-3.86)
0.079***
(4.38)

(2)
Probit
Pr (Stock80%) = 1
0.297**
(1.99)
-0.047
(-0.42)
-0.028
(-1.06)
0.107
(0.74)
0.056**
(2.08)
-0.448*
(-1.79)
0.100***
(4.72)
-2.279***
(-5.51)
0.215***
(3.41)
0.184*
(1.79)
0.430
(1.54)
-0.072*
(-1.76)
0.205***
(3.18)
-0.614***
(-6.24)
0.081
(1.16)
-0.822***
(-4.71)

(3)
(4)
Two Stage Probit Least Squares
RelSize
Pr(Stock80% = 1)
0.042*
0.434**
(1.68)
(2.32)
-0.030*
-0.132
(-1.68)
(-0.96)
0.001
-0.022
(0.02)
(-0.97)
-0.047**
-0.029
(-2.28)
(-0.15)
-0.026***
-0.039
(-6.02)
(-0.65)
-0.128
(-0.37)
-0.014**
0.063**
(-2.50)
(2.02)
0.007
-2.326***
(0.06)
(-4.77)
-0.020
0.207***
(-0.01)
(2.79)
-0.018
(-1.03)
-0.186***
(-4.42)
0.026***
(4.20)
0.281***
(3.22)
-0.045*
-0.797***
(-1.67)
(-5.66)
-0.043***
-0.037
(-4.00)
(-0.36)
0.091**
-0.572***
(2.43)
(-2.56)
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Private target

-0.079***
(-7.39)
-0.002
(-0.20)
-0.014**
(-2.10)

High tech
M&A wave

0.108
(1.51)
0.259***
(2.98)
0.077
(1.61)

Inst_stock80%

-0.082***
(-7.21)
-0.014
(-0.79)
-0.018**
(-2.41)
0.018
(0.46)

Inst_relsize
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorp state FE
Number of observations
R2/Pseudo R2

0.127
(1.14)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.148

-2.263***
(-5.98)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.213

0.646***
(5.99)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.146
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-0.130
(-0.88)
0.262***
(2.60)
0.030
(0.50)

-3.095**
(-1.99)
-0.405
(-0.55)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.204

Table 6
Subsample analyses
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on acquirer announcement returns, conditional on
the quality of corporate governance. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999.
The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
(1)

(2)
E-index

Treat × Post

Controls
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorporation state FE
Number of observations
R2

Low
High
-0.675
-1.045*
(-0.63)
(-1.86)
H0: β(1) = β(2)
(0.741)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
583
1,311
0.158
0.099

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Number of blockholders
CEO ownership
Dep.= CAR(-2, +2)
Low
High
Low
High
-1.748**
-0.629
-1.407***
-0.845
(-2.22)
(-1.09)
(-2.91)
(-1.11)
H0: β(3) = β(4)
H0: β(5) = β(6)
(0.194)
(0.501)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,183
1,366
1,271
1,278
0.109
0.097
0.116
0.095
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(7)
(8)
CEO duality
No
Yes
-0.551
-1.638**
(-0.40)
(-2.13)
H0: β(7) = β(8)
(0.560)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
805
1,744
0.162
0.089

Table 7
Additional evidence
This table reports the results of additional tests. Panel A reports the results of regressions of the threat
of shareholder litigation on management EPS forecasts within a year before an acquisition. Fore_Error is
the difference between management’s EPS forecast and the actual EPS, divided by the lagged calendarend stock price. Abs(Fore_Error) is the absolute value of Fore_Error. Ln(1+duration) is the natural
logarithm of one plus the number of days from the announcement date of the management’s earnings
forecast to the announcement date of the M&A deal. Panel B reports the results of regressions of the
threat of shareholder litigation on earnings management in the quarter before an acquisition. Abnormal
accruals are calculated using the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Panel C
reports the results of logistic regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on the likelihood of CEO
turnover. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by the state of the
acquirer headquarters, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Panel A: Managerial Forecasting Error
(1)
Abs(Fore_Error)
2.150*
(1.75)
-0.844
(-0.55)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
694
0.204

Treat × Post
Treat
Controls
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorporation state FE
Observations
R2
Panel B: Earnings Management
(1)

Treat × Post

Treat
Controls
Constant
Year FE

Full sample
1.469***
(3.56)

-1.592***
(-8.21)
Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
Fore_Error
1.931**
(2.27)
0.190
(0.18)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
694
0.130

(2)
(3)
Abnormal accruals
All-cash deals
Stock deals
-0.147
2.328***
(-0.19)
(6.66)
H0: β(1) = β(2)
(0.003)
-0.640
-1.707***
(-1.41)
(-6.94)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Industry FE
Incorporation state FE
Number of observations
R2
Panel C: CEO Turnover

Treat x Post × NegM&A
Treat × Post
Post × NegM&A
Treat × NegM&A
Treat
NegM&A
Post
Controls
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorporation state FE
Number of observations
Pseudo R2

Yes
Yes
1,719
0.11
(1)
(2)
Pr (CEO Turnover) = 1
marginal effect
-0.332
-0.058
(-0.98)
0.084
0.016
(0.38)
-0.475**
-0.085
(-2.04)
0.681**
0.143
(2.45)
-0.598**
-0.104
(-2.04)
0.244
0.046
(1.07)
0.086
0.016
(0.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,626
0.125

Yes
Yes
573
0.20

Yes
Yes
1,146
0.15

(3)
(4)
Pr (forced CEO Turnover) = 1
marginal effect
-2.789***
-0.039
(-3.23)
0.660
0.025
(0.69)
-0.401
-0.011
(-0.55)
0.725
0.029
(1.06)
-0.332
-0.010
(-0.47)
0.291
0.009
(0.56)
-0.740
-0.024
(-0.63)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,626
0.158
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Table 8
Sensitivity analyses
This table presents the results of a series of sensitivity analyses. The variation in the threat of
shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999. In Columns (1), (2), and (3)
of Panel A, we exclude tech firms, the years 1999 and 2000, and Silicon Valley firms, respectively. In
Column (4), we limit our analysis to border states in the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction. In Column (5) of Panel
B, we use headquarters information from SEC Form 10-K filings. In Column (6), we include UD laws. In
Column (7), we control for various state anti-takeover laws, including control share acquisition, business
combination, fair price, directors’ duties, and poison pill laws. In Column (8), we additionally control for
a firm’s information quality by including Restate and Ln(Analyst). In Panel C, we consider an alternative
event window of (-1, +1). The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by
acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Panel A
(1)

(2)

Exclude tech
firms
Treat × Post
Controls
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorp state FE
Number of observations
R2
Panel B

-0.926*
(-1.79)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,805
0.09
(5)

(6)

HQ
information
from SEC
Treat × Post

(3)
Exclude firms
Exclude 99 &
in Silicon
00
Valley
CAR (–2, +2)
-1.316***
-1.054*
(-2.87)
(-1.97)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,820
2,368
0.09
0.08

-1.275***
(-2.75)

UD laws
Control share acquisition laws
Business combination laws

(7)
Control
Control UD
additional
Laws
state
regulations
CAR (–2, +2)
-1.308***
-1.318***
(-2.87)
(-2.89)
1.162
0.827
(1.26)
(0.912)
9.671***
(3.05)
1.097
(0.58)
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(4)
Firms around
state borders
-6.224***
(-6.36)
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
50
0.34
(8)
Control
disclosure
quality
-1.325***
(-2.82)

Fair price laws

-4.362
(-1.15)
-7.075**
(-2.34)
0.594
(0.57)

Directors' duties laws
Poison pill laws
Restate

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.069

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.07

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.07

1.522
(1.49)
-0.029
(-0.10)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,549
0.07

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Ln(Analysts)
Controls
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Incorp state FE
Number of observations
R2
Panel C

Treat × Post
Controls
Year FE
Industry FE
Year and Industry FE
Incorp state FE
Number of observations
R2

CAR (–1, +1)
-0.705*
-0.909**
(-1.90)
(-2.65)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
2,549
2,186
0.070
0.074

-0.713**
(-2.07)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2,549
0.049
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-0.482
(-1.09)
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
2,186
0.153

Appendix 1
Variable definitions
Variable
Definition and data source
Measures of shareholder litigation
Treat
An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is headquartered in one of the
nine states under the Ninth Circuit Court’s jurisdiction (Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).
Source: SEC Filings and Compustat
Post
An indicator variable, equal to one if the deal announcement date is after
1999. Source: SDC
Measure of acquisition performance
CAR (–2, +2)
Acquirer's five-day CAR, calculated using the market model. The market
model parameters are estimated for the period (–210, –11), with the CRSP
value-weighted return as the market index. Source: CRSP
Bidder CEO characteristics
CEO age >= 60
An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is 60 or older, and zero
otherwise. Source: Execucomp
CEO gender

An indicator variable, equal to one if the CEO is male, and zero otherwise.
Source: Execucomp

CEO delta

Dollar increase in acquirer CEO's portfolio wealth for a percentage increase in
the underlying stock price. Source: Execucomp

CEO duality

An indicator variable, equal to one if the CEO is also the chairperson of the
board of directors, and zero otherwise. Source: Execucomp

CEO overconfidence

A measure of how in-the-money the CEO's vested stock options are. This is
calculated by dividing the value of unexercised exercisable options
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) by the number of options
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM), all scaled by the stock price at the end of the fiscal
year (PRCC). Source: Execucomp and Compustat

CEO ownership
Percentage of shares held by the CEO. Source: Execucomp
Bidder firm characteristics
Ln(Assets)
Natural logarithm of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat
Leverage
Book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by book value of total assets (AT).
Source: Compustat
Tobin’s Q

Market value of assets over book value of assets ((AT – CEQ + CSHO × PRCC) ÷
AT). Source: Compustat

Free cash flow

Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) minus interest expense (XINT)
minus income taxes (TXT) minus capital expenditures (CAPX), all divided by
total assets (AT). Source: Compustat
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Sales growth

Net sales (SALE) minus lagged net sales, all divided by lagged net sales.
Source: Compustat

Firm governance

Governance quality index, consisting of CEO duality, board independence,
and the E-index. We split each of the three measures into two groups, with
higher values of board independence, lower E-index values, and lack of CEO
duality indicating better governance, and cumulate the ranks (0–1). We then
divide the cumulated ranks by the number of measures available for the firmyear to obtain the governance index score. A higher value indicates better
governance. Source: Execucomp and Riskmetrics

Institutional ownership

Percentage of common shares owned by institutional investors. Source:
Thomson Reuters 13f Filings

Abnormal accruals

Abnormal accruals are calculated using the modified Jones model. Source:
Compustat

Deal characteristics
Stock price runup

Bidder's buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) during the period (–210, –
11). The market index is the CRSP value-weighted return. Source: CRSP

Relative deal size (or
RelSize)

Deal value over bidder's market value of equity at the 11th day prior to deal
announcement. Source: SDC and CRSP

High-tech

An indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder and target are both from
high-tech industries, as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), and zero
otherwise.

Cross-border

An indicator variable, equal to one if the target nation is not the same as the
acquirer nation, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC

Cross-industry

An indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder and target do not share a
Fama–French industry, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC

All-cash deal

An indicator variable, equal to one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero
otherwise. Source: SDC

Stock80%

An indicator variable, equal to one if 80% of the acquisition is funded by
stock, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC

Private target

An indicator variable, equal to one for private targets, and zero otherwise.
Source: SDC

NegM&A

An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm experiences value-decreasing
M&A announcement returns, and zero otherwise.

M&A Wave

Annual number of acquisitions in a given industry.
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Treated target
Information quality
Restate

Ln(Analysts)
Fore_Error
Abs(Fore_Error)
Ln(1+ duration)

An indicator variable, equal to one if the target firm is in a Ninth Circuit state,
and zero otherwise. Source: SDC
An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm restates its financial statements
in the given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Source: GAO Financial
Restatement Database
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing the firm’s
earnings forecast. Source: I/B/E/S
Management’s EPS forecast minus actual EPS, divided by lagged calendar-end
stock price. Source I/B/E/S
Absolute value of Fore_Error
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of days from the announcement
date of management’s earnings forecast to the announcement date of the
M&A deal. Source: I/B/E/S and SDC
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Appendix 2
First stage of Heckman model: Sample selection correction
This table presents the results from the probit regression used in the first stage of the Heckman model,
which corrects for sample selection bias. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered by acquirer headquarter state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
1% level is indicated by ***. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
(1)
Pr(Acquisition = 1)
-0.003
(-0.835)
0.088
(-0.444)
-0.006
(-1.363)
0.700***
(8.034)
0.060***
(3.613)
-0.077
(-0.621)
0.018
(1.281)
0.940***
(4.040)
0.276***
(5.304)
0.063
(0.996)
-1.650***
(-3.629)
Yes
Yes
7,250
0.08

CEO age >= 60
CEO gender
CEO delta
CEO overconfidence
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
Tobin’s Q
Free cash flow
Sales growth
Firm governance
Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Number of observations
Pseudo R2
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